Notre Dame Law School

NDLScholarship
Journal Articles

Publications

1920

Constitutional Law - War Powers of Congress
(Validity of Conscription Act)
Francis Joseph Vurpillat
Notre Dame Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Military, War, and
Peace Commons
Recommended Citation
Francis J. Vurpillat, Constitutional Law - War Powers of Congress (Validity of Conscription Act), 1 Notre Dame L. Rep. 41 (1920).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/977

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by
an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

NOTRE DAME LAW REPORTER

ONLY

OUR

OWN

OPINION

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-WAR POWERS OF CONGRESS.
(Validity of Conscription Act)*
by
Francis J. Vurpillat.
"NOTE: This paper was read before The Round Table of South Bend, Indiana,
and before the classes in constitutional law prior to the rendition of the decision by
the United States Supreme Court, sustaining the Conscription Act.

The paper is

here presented in its original form, by request, on account of its controversial character and legal-brief style, the subject-matter of constitutional law and war powers
being ever new to students of the law.
The subject, the validity of the the Supreme Court of the United
Conscription Act, necessarily pre- States that "The only Government of
sents a legal question. But it is at this country which other nations
once a question intensely interesting recognize or treat with is the Governto the layman as well as to the law- ment of the Union, and the only
yer, because of its vital importance American Flag known throughout the
to the nation in this world-war crisis, world is the Flag of the United
to the General Government in its States." Fong Yue Ting vs. U. S.
powers to cope with an unscrupulous 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1016-37 L. Ed. 905.
and dangerous enemy, to all the citi- The United States, therefore, poszens in their rights and conditions sesses the character of a sovereign
affected, and especially to the mil- nation. The Constitution confides tc
lions of young Americans who must the General Government plenary conanswer their country's call to serve trol over all foreign relations. A
as soldiers and, if need be, die in this large measure of the internal soverunprecedented war on foreign battle- eignty or local government is left
to the states, subject, however, to the
fields.
That we may clearly understand the express provision in the Constitution
points for and against the Conscrip- itself that this Constitution and the
tion Act we must keep in mind the laws and treaties made pursuant
peculiar nature of our government, thereto "shall be the supreme law of
national and state, and its constitu- the land."
We come now to consider whether
tional history. Under the Articles of
Confederation, before the adoption of the United States as a sovereign nathe Constitution, the states were tion, under the Constitution, has th
sovereign, completely independent power to enact the Conscription Act,
and bound together only by a league. which shall operate as the supreme
But as stated by Chief Justice Mar- law of the land, binding upon all the
shall, in McCulloch vs. Maryland, 4 citizens of the country even those
Wheat. 316-4 L. Ed. 579, "'in order who are for the time serving as memto form a more perfect union', it was bers of the State militia. True it is
deemed necessary to change this al- that the Federal Government has only
liance into an effective government, such powers as are expressly or by
possessing great and sovereign pow- necessary implication granted to it
ers." By the adoption of the Con- by the Constitution, and that all
stitution national sovereignty passed powers not so granted to the General
from the States to the United States. Government are reserved to the
nation and government. It is said by States and the people. But what is
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the rule of constitutional construction
that must be applied in determining
the powers of the United States?
In construing the commerce clause
of the Constitution in the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1-6 L. Ed.
23, Chief Justice Marshall laid down
the rule of construction which has
ever since been adhered to. The
Chief Justice said: "This instrument
contains an enumeration of powers
granted by the people to their government. It has been said that these
powers ought to be construed strictly.
But why ought they to be so construed? Is there one sentence in the
Constitution which gives countenance
to this rule? . . . What do the gentlemen mean by a strict construction?
. . . If they contend for that narrow
construction which, in support of
some theory not to be found in the
constitution, would deny to the government those powers which the
words of the grant, as usually understood, import, and which are consistent with the general views and objects of the instrument; for that narrow construction which would cripple
the government, and render it unequal to the objects for which it is
declared to be instituted, and to which
the powers given, as fairly understood, render it competent; then we
cannot perceive the propriety of this
strict construction, nor adopt it as
the rule by which the Constitution is
to be expounded. . . . We know of'no
rule for construing the extent of
such powers, other than is given by
the language of the instrument which
confers them, taken in connection
with the purposes for which they
were conferred."
This opinion of Chief Justice Marshall and the rule of construction
here stated, we would respectfully

urge upon the consideration of the
gentlemen who would cripple the national government in th defeat of
the Conscription Act by means of thai
strict and narrow construction of the
Constitution which is here so vigorously condemned.
In the absence of any express'grant
of power to Congress to declare war
and to raise and maintain armies by
any means it may deem necessary and
proper, we submit that such power
exists as a necessary attribute to
sovereignty, and must be construed
to have been conferred by the very
act of the creation of the United
States Government in the adoption of
the Constitution. Self preservation
is not only the first law of nature,
but of nations as well. To make war
and -peace with other nations is universally recognized as a legitimate
exercise of external sovereignty; and
this power necessarily implies the
power to raise and maintain armies
and navies to that end by any means
that the sovereign power may adopt.
Speaking of the Louisiana purchase
and the acquisition of Florida and
Alaska, Black, in his work on Constitutional Law, says: "The power cannot be derived from any narrow or
technical interpretation of the Constitution. But it is necessary to
recognize that there is in this country a national sovereignty. That being conceded, it easily follows that
the right to acquire territory is incidental to this sovereignty. It is in
effect a resulting power, growing
iecessarily out of the aggregate of
powers delegated to the national
government by the Constitution."
If sovereignty in itself be not sufficient to sustain the Conscription Act
as a war measure of the United
States, it must, however, exert a
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strong influence in the construction
to be put upon the enumerated war
powers granted to Congress by Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution,
which are as follows:
To declare war, grant letters of
marque and reprisal and make rules
concerning captures on land and
water;
To raise and support armies; (appropriations therefor to be made for
two years at a time) ;
To provide and maintain a navy;
To make rules for the government
and regulation of the land and naval
forces;
To provide for calling forth the
militia to execute the laws of the
Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming
and disciplining the militia and for
governing such part of them as may
be employed in the service of the
United States.
These powers are expressly granted, are absolute and without any limitation or restriction whatever as to
the means by which they may be exercised. And to these powers must
be added the provision that "the
President shall be the commander in
chief of the army and navy of the
United States and the militia of the
several states when called into the
actual service of the United States," a
provision which VonHolst's Constitutional Law declares, invests the president, as such commander, with all the
power which the King of England enjoyed as the commander of the land
and naval forces of the United Kingdom.
Concerning these war powers it is
said in Black's Constitutional Law
that "the power to declare war necessarily includes the authority to prose-

cute the war, and make it effective,
by all and any means, and in every
manner, known to and exercised by
any independent nation under the
rules and laws of war as the same arc
ascertained by the principles of international law. Justice Field, in the
case of Miller vs. United States II
Wall. 268-20 L. Ed. 135 says: "It is
evident that legislation founded upon
the war powers of the government,
and directed against the public enemies of the United States, is subject
to different considerations and limitations from those applicable to legislation founded upon the municipal
power of the government. . . . Legislation (founded on the war powers)
is subject to no limitations, except
such as are imposed by the law of
nations in the conduct of war. The
war powers of the government have
no express limitations in the constitution, and the only limitation to which
their exercise is subject is the law of
nations." In Stewart vs. Kahn (II
Wall, 493-20 L. Ed. 17) the Supreme
Court says: "The measures to be
taken in carrying on war and to suppress insurrections are not defined.
The decision of all such questions
rests wholly in the discretion of those
to whom the substantial powers involved are confided by the constitution." In construing the enumerated
power granted to Congress "to make
all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution
the foregoing powers," Chief Justice
Marshall said:
"We think the sound construction
of the Constitution must allow to the
national legislature that discretion,
with respect to the means by which
the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high
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duties assigned to it, in the manner
most beneficial to the people. Let the
end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the Constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which
are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited, but consist
with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional."
In the light of the principles and
rules enunciated, and with the guidance afforded us by the eminent authorities cited, let us proceed to a
construction of the constitution necessary to sustain the validity of the
Conscription Act.
In addition to the unrestricted
powers granted to Congress to raise
and support armies, to provide and
maintain a navy, and to make rule.
for the government and regulation of
the land and naval forces, for the purpose of waging any war it may declare, Congress also is given the,
power "to provide for calling forth
the militia to execute the laws of the
Union, to suppress insutrections and
repel invasions" and "to provide for
organizing, arming and disciplining
the militia. . .

."

It is the attempt

to construe this added power over the
state militia for domestic purposes,
into a limitation upon the absolute
and unrestricted powers of Congress
over all its citizens for war purposes,
that furnishes the only apparent objection to the Conscription Act. We
say apparent objection advisedly, for
it is not a real objection.
True it is that, when Congress calls
forth the militia for the purely domestic purposes enumerated in the
constitution such militia cannot be
made to serve beyond the territorial
limits of the United States. The Supreme Court has so held. But these
decisions must be considered as hold-

ing simply this, and nothing more.
They can have no application to the
Conscription Act, because that act is
not founded upon the militia clause
of the Constitution at all. The Conscription Act is a legitimate exercise
of national sovereignty, and is founded upon the war powers expi'essly
granted in the Constitution, and calhforth all the citizens of the country,
without discrimination for the purpose of raising and maintaining an
army to wage a foreign war already
upon us. Mr. George W. Wickershaw, as Attorney General of the
United States, speaking of an Act of
Congress, of date March 27, 1908,
founded upon the militia power,
which attempted to authorize the
President to call the militia for use.
and when so called, to serve either
within or without the territory of the
United States," said: "If this provision were to be construed to authorize Congress to use the Organized
Militia for any other than the three
purposes specified, it would be unconstitutional." This opinion is said
to militate against the Conscription
Act. But note the language of this
eminent lawyer: "If this provision
is to be construed to authorize Congress to use the Organized Militia."
Organized Militia being capitalized,
clearly having reference, therefore,
to the Organized Militia as such. The
Conscription Act does nothing of the
kind and bears no similarity to the
act construed by Mr. Wickersham.
Furthermore, we are informed that
the one-time Attorney General, at the
recent meeting of the American Bar
Association stated that his official
opinion applied to an act founded on
the militia power of Congress, and
could have no application to the Conscription Act which is based solely
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upon the other war powers of Congress. Thus, all this argument and
citation of authority brought to the
attack of the Conscription Act, must
fall before the irrefutable logic of the
country justice of the peace, that
"they have no bearance on the case."
In the case of Burroughs vs. Peyton, 16 Gratton 475 the militia is defined as "a body of men composed of
citizens occupied temporarily in the
pursuit of civil life, while an army is
said to be a body of men whose business is war." Why should the militia
of the state be recognized as having
any greater right than other citizens
of the United States? Why should
they be exempted from the call of
their country in time of national peril
and disaster? Are they any less citizens of the United States because
they are militia? What divine right
of the State or what inalienable
character of its militia, exempts such
citizens from their country's call to
arms that every other citizen in the
land must answer? To so construe the
powers of congress as to give absolute exemption to the state militia, is
to put it into the p6wer of the state
to thwart the powers of Congress altogether; for, if a state may make
militia of some of its citizens it may
make militia of all. Thus would all
the war powers of congress be made
nugatory, except, indeed, the socalled power to raise a volunteer
army, and this exception, we submit,
is a rank contradiction in termspower to raise a volunteer. To raise
this absurd contention to the dignity
of a constitutional construction would
be to transform the already vanishing war power of Congress to a mere
glimmering hope that some patriots
might volunteer to come to the rescue
of their helpless country. The state

has no such power, and the citizen,
merely because he happens to be a
member of the state militia, has no
such exemption. The Constitution of
the United States and the Conscription Law enacted pursuant thereto,
are the supreme law of the land, "any
thing in the constitutions or !.ws of
any state to the contrary notwithstanding," as so prescribed in this
very language of the Constitution itself.
The Constitution makes no provision whatever for a national militia.
There is no such thing; and whoever
uses that phrase commits error. In
lieu of such national militia, Congress is empowered to call the state
militia to serve the same purposes in
the nation that they are organized tc
serve in their respective states. The
militia is a peace organization for domestic purposes only. The Constitution does make provision for a National Army. Congress is empowered
to call all the citizens of the United
States to serve the same purposes as
any army in the world may be made
to serve its nation. The National
Army is a war organization for the
purpose of waging war. There are
two express powers affecting the
militia, as such, for the domestic purposes enumerated. There are four
other express powers affecting the
citizens, as such, and these are for
purposes of war. No necessary relation exists between these militia
powers on the one hand and the four
war powers on the other hand. No
conflict need be invited in the process
of their construction. Indeed such
conflict can be and should be avoided.
In the absence of the two provisions
relating to the militia, no difficulty
would arise in the construction of the
four war powers first enumerated in
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the constitution which establish the
power of Congress to raise an army
by calling all its citizens. Why, then,
should the two provisions that follow,
granting added power to Congress
over an entirely distinct subject matter, be construed as a subtraction
from or a limitation upon the war
powers already enumerated and
granted without an "if".
In no important case has the discretionary power of Congress over
the means to be employed in the execution of any of its enumerated powers been denied by the Supreme
Court of the United States and a fixed
and arbitrary rule of construction applied instead. Nor will such a rule
of construction be adopted in this
case to deny the sound discretion exercised by Congress in the enactment
of the Conscription Act. "It would
have been an unwise attempt," says
Chief Justice Marshall (McCulloch
vs. Maryland) "to provide by immutable rules, for exegencies which,
if foreseen at all, must have been
seen dimly, and which can be best
provided for as they occur." Justice
Strong, in the second Legal Tender
Decision, says: "It was at such a
time and in such an emergency (Civil
War) that the Legal Tender Acts
were passed. Now, if it were certain
that nothing else would have supplied the absolute necessities of the
treasury, that nothing else would
have enabled the government to maintain its armies and navy, that nothing
else would have saved the government
and the Constitution from destruction, while the Legal Tender Acts
would, could any one be bold enough
to assert that Congress transgressed
its powers." Anent the war powers
of Congress the United States Supreme Court already has given ex-

pression to a strong opinion in the
Tarbel's Case 13 Wall. 408-20 L. Ed.
601. In this case the court said:
"Among the powers assigned to the
government is the power to raise and
support armies. . . . Its control over
the subject is plenary and exclusive.
It can determine without question
from any state authority how the
army shall be raised, whether by
voluntary enlistments or forced draft
the age at which the soldier shall be
received and the period for which
he shall be taken ,the compensation
he shall be allowed, and the service
to which he shall be assigned."
But what of the contentions against
the validity of the Conscription Act 5
The cardinal rule to be observed in
the interpretation of the constitution
is that effect must be given to the intention of the people who adopted it.
And this intention must be ascertained from the instrument itself,
from the very language used to ex-

press that intention. If this language
does not plainly import the intention,
if indeed, it be ambiguous, then resort may be had to the expressed pur.
poses for which -the instrument was
adopted and the government was established. If ambiguity still remains,
then, and not until then, have we a
right to consider matters extraneou
of the constitution itself in aid of itf

interpretation.
We strenuously deny that any
ambiguity exists as to the nature or

extent of the war powers granted to
Congress in the Constitution. The
language used in the grant of these
powers is so plain and unequivocal
that "he that runs may read." These
powers appear in four enumerations
of Sec. 8, Article I. ante, each without a word, phrase, clause or sentence, qualifying or restricting the
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power, as for instance, the power "to
declare war" and "to raise and support armies."
The only contention against the
Conscription Act which is based upon
any construction of the language of
the Constitution at all, is the persistent fallacy of construing the Act as
an exercise of power over the state
militia in virtue of the separately
enumerated grant of such power, instead of construing it, as Congress
expressly declares it to be and as it
clearly is, an exercise of the war
powers in virtue of the four enumerated grants of power for such purpose. We have already adverted to
this. The enumerated powers of Congress over the state militia also need
no aid in their construction. Their
language too is plain and unequivocal.
In the absence of any declaration of
war by Congress and the enactment
by it of a law such as the Conscription Act for raising a national army,
neither Congress nor the President
can call and use the state militia, as
such, for purposes other than those
enumerated in the Constitution,
namely: "to execute the laws of the
Union, to suppress insurrection and
repel invasions." That the militia,
who are mere peace officers, have always been recognized as having immunity from service "outside the
realm" is admitted, and that "such
immunity was a thousand years old"
in Great Britain before the adoption
of our Constitution. But that any
citizen of any civilized country under
the sun since the dawn of time ever
held immunity from his country's call
to war, we emphatically deny. Even
England, as is well known, has used
her citizens as soldiers for the prosecution of wars, both offensive and
defensive, everywhere throughout
her whole history, despite the much

vaunted immunity of the militia.
And the acts of Parliament declaring
such wars and raising armies to wage
them did not constitute any amendments to the so-called British Constitution, but were the legitimate and
frequent exercise of the sovereign
power inherent in every organized
government, whether autocratic or
democratic.
The debates in the Constitutional
Convention of 1787 are palpably perverted and misapplied In argument
against the Conscription Act. That
convention was created by Congress
to amend the Articles of Confede-ation, but it found that instrument so
defective as not to admit of correction. The convention, therefore,
abandoned altogether the purpose for
which it was called, and instead,
adopted the Constitution which it reported to Congress with the recommendation that it be referred to the
States, to be by them in turn submitted to the people for adoption. In
this manner was the United States
Government established. So inherently defective were the Articles of
Confederation that they were thus
rejected as an entirety. And the one
defect that stood out more prominently than all the others, was the
utter inadequacy of power in the
United States Government to wage
war and to raise and support armies;
the utter inefficiency of the state
militia as a war organization upon
which the General Government was
made to depend. To obviate for all
time this defect, which almost proved
fatal to the success of the revolution
and to our independence, and to make
of the United States under the Constitution a powerful nation, equal in
sovereignty to every other state in
the international world, there were
adopted by that Constitutional Con-
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vention the four unrestricted powers,
namely: to declare war, to raise and
support armies, to provide and main-,
tain a navy, and to govern the land,
and naval forces. The intention of.
the patriots who framed the Constitution and the people who- adopted
it is to be derived from the plain language used by them to express that
intention and to create the power
granted, and not by resort to any
individual construction put upon the
conflicting statements made in convention debate. And yet, there are a
few men insisting in this manner
upon such a construction of the Constitution as will make the United
States of today still dependent upon
the state militia and, in fact, more
impotent and inefficient than it was
under the Articles of Confederation,
-a contention so palpably absurd as
to provoke -derision and contempt.
The real solution of the militia and
war power controversy in the Constitutional Convention is this: No
national militia was created at all,
but instead the states were permitted
to retain their respective militia and
the General Government empowered
to call and use these militia for the
enumerated national peace purposes
of executing the laws of the Union, to
suppress insurrection and repel invasions. And to obviate the grave
defect and impotency in the National
Government of having to depend
upon the state militia in time of war,
the four enumerated war powers
were conferred without any limitation whatever as to the extent of
those powers or the means by which
they were to be exercised.
Except for the purposes of the
Civil War, when President Lincoln
and the Congress did not hesitate to
adopt the conscription and enforced
draft, it has always been the policy

of the government to depend upon
the state militia for domestic purposes and upon the volunteer system
for general war purposes. This policy
of the Government has been uniformly criticised and condemned by military men and writers on the military
unpreparedness of the United States.
And President Wilson in his public
speeches plainly pointed out the inadequacy of this policy in the present
world-war crisis, as a reason why the
Congress .hould enact the Conscription Law. And yet, strange as it may
seem, these criticisms of the government for adhering to such a policy
are cited as establishing the principle
that the Government is powerless to
raise an army by any other than the
militia and volunteer systems. This
furnishes the perfect example of the
boomerang in argument. Instead of
establishing the invalidity of the Conscription Act, these criticisms have
at last influenced Congress to exercise its discretionary power of raising a national army by the more adequate means of Conscription and
these military men and writers now
are approving the congressional
action.
We have no patience with the contention for a construction of the constitution that would make the United
States more impotent and inefficient
than it was under the Articles of
Confederation, and that would leave
it a pitiable and humiliating spectacle
in the gaze of the international world
-a sovereign nation shorn of its inherent power to wage war and raise
and support armies; to resist wanton
assaults upon' its sovereign rights,
and threatened destruction of its institutions; unable to defend its citizens or to prevent the substitution of
an autocracy for the present glorious
freedom of its people. And yet we see
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this very contention emblazoned, by
a few, in speech and petition, with all
the fallacy, sophistry and vociferousness of the demagogue. No wonder
the great Lincoln was stirred to real
eloquence and just wrath by the same
ill-timed and illogical contention
against the conscription act of the
Civil War that is urged against the
present act, to give expression to the
following opinion in support of the
power of Congress validly to enact
such a law. President Lincoln said:
"In this case, those who desire the
rebellion to succeed, and others who
seek reward in .a different way, are
very active in accommodating us with
this class of arguments. They tell us
the law is unconstitutional. It is the
first instance, I believe, in which the
power of Congress to do a thing has
ever been questioned in a case when
the power is given by the Constitution in express terms. Whether a
power can be implied when it is not
expressed has often been the subject
of controversy; but this is the first
case in which the degree of effrontery
has been ventured upon by denying a
power which is plainly and distinctly
written down in the Constitution.
The Constitution declares that 'the
Congress shall have power . . . to
raise and support armies; but no appropriation of money to that use shall
be for a longer time than two years.'
The whole scope of the conscription
act is 'to raise and support armies.'
There is nothing else in it. . . . Do
you admit that the power is given to
raise and support armies, and yet insist that by this act Congress has not
exercised the power in a constitutional mode, has not done the thing in
the right way? Who is to judge that?
The Constitution gives Congress the
power, but it does not prescribe the
mode, or expressly declare who shall

prescribe it. In such case Congress
must prescribe the mode or relinquish the power. There is no alternative. . . . The power is given
fully, completely, unconditionally. It
is not a power to raise armies if state
authorities consent; nor if the men to
compose the armies are entirely willing; but it is a power to raise and
support armies given to Congress by
the Constitution without an 'if.'....
The principle of the draft, which simply is involuntary or enforced service, is not new. It has been practiced in all ages of the world. It was
well known to the framers of our
Constitution as one of the modes of
raising armies, at the time they
placed in that instrument the provision that 'the Congress shall have
power to raise and support armies'
Wherein is the peculiar hardship now?"
The foregoing opinion was quoted
by Honorable Charles E. Hughes, late
Justice of the United States Supreme
Court, in his recent address before
the American Bar Association. Mr.
Hughes commented on this opinion as
follows: "These are the words of
Lincoln, penned in the midst of the
Civil War, in which conscription was
enforced, and his reasoning is conclusive. And while the question was
not presented to the United States
Supreme Court, the power of Congress was explicitly recognized in
Tarbel's case. 13 Wall. 407,-20 L. Ed.
600, and in later opinions."
"To provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare,
and secure the blessings of liberty to
ourselves and our posterity" and "to
make the (United States and the)
world safe for democracy," the Congress has recognized a state of war
existing against us and has enacted
the Conscription Law as the neces-
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sary means for raising and maintaining an army to wage this war. If it
be said that these means resorted to
by Congress in the enforced draft,
and by the President as Commander
in Chief of the army in using our
forces to fight a foreign foe on foreign fields, are extraordinary means,
it must immediately be replied that
the conditions confronting us too are
extraordinary and cannot be met by
any other means. A war-mad military autocracy, which can be compared only to the very "Gates of
Hell" described by the Scriptures, is
trying to prevail against Christianity, civilization and international law,
to impose upon us and the world
their military domination and to destroy the constitutional democracy
which now is our glorious heritage.
We firmly believe that the sound
discretion exercised by Congress in
the adoption of the Conscription Act
as the means of raising an army for
use in the present world-war crisis
will be sustained by the United States
Supreme Court, just as such discretionary right of Congress as to the
means to be used has always been
recognized in every important exercise of its power under the Constitution. Witness the decisions sustaining the National Bank Act, the Confiscation Acts of the Civil War, the
Legal Tender Act, the Sherman AntiTrust Law and the Adamson Eighthour Law.

Would it not be a violation of the
fundamental principle of our institutions, that one of the separate departments of the government shall not
usurp power committed by the Constitution to another department, for
the Judiciary in this case to deny to
the Legislative Branch the war
powers and the discretionary means
of exercising them when they are ex.
pressly conferred upon The Congress
by the Constitution?
Are not these war powers and their
exercise by Congress, and the power
of the Executive, as Commander in
Chief of the Army, to fight on foreign
fields, political powers for which The
Congress and the President, respectively, are answerable only to the people,-political powers over which the
Judiciary can assume no jurisdiction
whatever?
We believe that the Judiciary will
be in unison with the Legislative and
Executive branches of the Government in respect of these powers and
the means of their exercise; and that,
as a result, our country will emerge
from this national crisis and worldwar triumphant and victorious, with
the sun of American Democracy shining throughout the world more brilliantly than ever before, and with the
Flag of the United States floating
higher in the heavens, inspiring renewed love and patriotism in the people at home and a lasting gratitude
and respect in the peoples abroad.

